Abortion

(Written Feb. 2019)

Before you read on, let me lay out the purpose of this paper. I am not arguing for either one of the sides in this debate, my interest is in the arguments themselves. I hope that this paper will stimulate respectful debate, and help each of us see the arguments on both sides. Last year, I came across what I think is the best argument for the pro-life position, and a few months ago, I came up with a few strong objections to it. I encourage all of you to read on and abide by what 

Francis Bacon once said…

“Read not to contradict and confute; nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider.”

Something strange has happened with abortion since Roe v. Wade; instead of being accepted by the public and viewed as a part of the modern culture (as gay marriage was), abortion is as hotly debated today as it was 40 years ago, and the American public is extremely divided over the issue. According to The Economist, 29% of Americans are in favor of legalizing abortion in all circumstances, and 18% are in favor of a complete ban. The sheer fact that abortion continues to be at the forefront of public debate and political campaigning is evidence that it is a unique moral dilemma, and as the pro-life side will argue, not only does abortion contradict moral frameworks, it is also contradictory to science and reason themselves. (I was very interested in the latter argument, and especially how the pro-life position bridges the is/ought gap. Ultimately I think it relies on some assumptions, as all arguments do, but it is much stronger than the usual religious claims that pro-life advocates make.) 

To begin, the first assertion that the argument makes is that abortion is contradictory to the very method that the pro-choice and non-religious crowd use to justify their worldview(s) – science. Christopher Hitchens, the famous atheist, says, “I believe that the concept ‘unborn child’ is a real concept, yes, and I’ve had a lot of quarrels with some of my fellow materialists and secularists on this point. I think that if the concept child means anything, then the concept unborn child can be said to mean something, and actually, all the discoveries of embryology, which have been very considerable, in the last generation, appear to confirm that opinion.” Hitchens is, technically speaking, spot-on in his observation here, as all of the scientific literature on embryology that I could find confirms that human life does begin at conception. A few examples are:

• Life Before Birth. 2nd ed. England: Mosby-Wolfe, 1996, p.31
• Foundations of Embryology. 6th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996, p.3
• Langman’s Medical Embryology. 7th edition. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins 1995, p.3
• Essentials of Human Embryology. Toronto: B.C. Decker Inc, 1988, p.2

At conception, all of the necessary requirements for human development are in place, and a fetus, at any stage of development, is human. The literature is clear on this, and nowhere in literature does the view that life begins at birth appear. (More on this later.) 

Now, this is interesting because, at this point, it’s pretty well justified that there exists a human X at conception. But, what is this X? Is it a person? A being? All of this evidence, thus, poses at least two questions regarding the fetus: what is it, and whether it ‘evolves’ in personhood as it grows in the womb. To answer this, the pro-life position has to set out to define ‘personhood’: what it is when it begins, and what it entails. You’ll notice that so far, the argument has one main premise – there exists a human X at conception. The argument will eventually have to go from this premise to the conclusion that abortion ought to be prohibited, and it’s in between the premise and the conclusion that philosophy begins.   

But first, what exactly constitutes personhood? In the pro-choice community, many ad hoc definitions are thrown around and accepted arbitrarily depending on the circumstance. This is one of the weak points of their arguments. For example, the objection that a fetus is not a person because it depends on the mother for life is often used. However, this is quite unsatisfactory. There is no place in ethics that propagates the view that personhood is dependent solely on a “being” being able to support themselves without aid. If this principle is adopted then those humans on life support would not be considered persons, but they certainly are. (This analogy does hold because life support and the fetus being dependent on the mother through the umbilical cord are extremely similar. Also, there is no genetic difference between a person on life support and a fetus. They both carry the same DNA structure that was implanted to them at conception. And thus, they are both equally human). Furthermore, I’ve heard that the fetus becomes a person when it leaves the womb. But, how can spatial location alone determine what is and is not a person? Imagine a matrix type situation where I am inserted into a makeshift womb. Would I cease to be a person then? Surely not. 

The objection that a fetus is not a person because it is not conscious is also used to a large extent. However, this argument doesn’t hold much weight either. In What’s It Like to Be a Bat? Thomas Nagel demonstrates that our subjective experience is unique to our own minds. In other words, we cannot know what is going on inside the mind of others, we can only imagine or guess. So, the fact that someone can claim that a fetus is not conscious is quite literally basing that claim on no evidence at all. There is no way to tell if the fetus is conscious because you aren’t the fetus. And if Cartesian Dualism or Idealism is the foundation of the universe then the mind is a fundamental substance and one could argue that the fetus is actually conscious. The point is that we just don’t have enough information to know when consciousness develops or what it is. Because of that, basing the conception of personhood off of consciousness doesn’t make a lot of sense. Moreover, the same argument regarding the person on life-support works in this case. 

Trying to use consciousness as a sufficient condition for personhood, as the pro-choice claim mentioned above does, also runs into two more problems, one being a practical issue and the other being a devastating scientific problem. John Locke attempts to define personal identity using the memory/consciousness criteria – identity being based on the memory of the person. However, Locke runs into problems with this criterion, which he acknowledges. He says that if a person is asleep, then the person would not be considered conscious. This is the issue that the pro-choice claim suffers from as well. If their ad hoc definition of a person is to be universally held, as it should since arbitrarily changing your principles on a whim to fit different situations is quite the error in reasoning, then people sleeping, or in vegetative states would lack the sufficient condition for personhood. If the pro-choice movement wants to strengthen their arguments, they will have to put together a clear and consistent definition of what a person is. 

So what exactly is a person? The pro-life argument defines it as someone who is capable of engaging in conscious action. I think this is a good definition for two reasons. First, it doesn’t suffer from the above attacks. Second, it is easily applicable, and prima facie pretty solid. One objection that can be raised against it is the same objection I cited when I referred to Nagel’s paper, specifically the fact that we don’t know when consciousness appears. The pro-life argument addresses this, and as you’ll see, this constitutes the second premise.  

In fact, there is empirical evidence that a fetus does demonstrate signs of conscious activity at the age of fourteen weeks. A study conducted in 2010 (Wired to Be Social: The Ontogeny of Human Interaction. Umberto Castiello, Cristina Becchio, Stefania Zoia, Cristian Nelini, Luisa Sartori, Laura Blason, Giuseppina D’Ottavio, Maria Bulgheroni, Gallese Published: October 7, 2010. Retrieved From https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0013199) demonstrated that the movement of fetuses is intentional. The study found that when reaching for their eyes, lips, or twin, the fetuses’ hands had a rate of incremental deceleration. In other words, as the fetus slowed down its movement as it became closer to whatever goal it was attempting to achieve. This is consistent with your action of reaching for your face or a glass of water. Your hand decelerates as it becomes closer to the goal in order to prevent a dangerous full-speed collision. For these reasons, the actions of the fetus are not impulsive, but intentional, just as when you intentionally reach for your eyes or lips.

Another study, (Development of Normal Fetal Movements: The First 25 Weeks of Gestation. Piontelli, A. (2010)), found similar evidence:

“Detailed observational studies of fetal behavior using real-time ultrasonography also demonstrate an exploratory sensation testing nature of fetal action from as early as ten weeks gestational age. At this stage of development, some areas of the body are innervated with sensory nerve fibers and others are not. Those that are innervated, such as the lips, cheeks, ears, and parietal bone are frequently touched by the hand, the fingers of which are themselves richly innervated… Fetuses have been observed exploring the boundary of innervated and unenervated regions, particularly at the anterior fontanel of the forehead where innervation ceases. As the nervous innervation of the forehead increases and the boundary migrates during development, so the fetus’ exploration of this region migrates with the boundary.”

This is yet another piece of support for the fact that fetuses are capable of conscious action when in the womb. Hence, a fetus, at least around the age of fourteen weeks, satisfies the amended definition of what a person is. The main argument now becomes apparent. 

Premise One: There exists a human X in the womb

Principle/Definition: A person is a human that is capable of conscious action. 

Premise Two: A fetus, at least around the age of 14 weeks, is a human person.

The core premises are established, and I think they are pretty well justified. But, the tricky part now begins. How, from these descriptive premises, can the pro-life position conclude the prescriptive claim that abortion should not be permitted? Think about it in the context of a simpler argument: the wall is blue; therefore, we should paint it. In between those two statements, there exists the philosophical assumption that ‘if a wall is blue we should paint it.’ But is this assumption justified? How? Does it need to be justified? What about the justification for justification itself? How long must we go down the rabbit hole on this one? (Welcome to philosophy!) Here then is the argument in its entirety: 

Premise One: There exists a human X in the womb

Principle/Definition: A person is a human that is capable of conscious action. 

Premise Two: A fetus, at least around the age of 14 weeks, is a human person.

Assumption 1: The fetus is innocent 

Principle/Assumption 2: We should not kill innocent human persons

Conclusion: We should not kill a fetus past the age of (about) fourteen weeks 

The way that the is/ought gap is bridged is through assumptions one and two. They are essentially axiomatic principles derived from Judeo-Christian morality, specifically the command “Thou shall not murder,” and the biblical conception of innocence found in some stories in the OT. These principles seem self-evident, and I would guess that most of us accept them. However, they can still be questioned, and that’s the job of philosophy. 

What is innocence? What does it mean to be innocent? This is a difficult question. To illustrate the difficulty, consider two thought experiments. If we went back in time to Hitler’s childbirth and knew what kind of monster he would grow up to be, would it be morally justified to kill him as a child? More fundamentally, is baby Hitler innocent? The answer isn’t clear. In the West we believe that humans have fundamental individual rights, such as the right to life, and that right cannot be taken away on the basis of something that the individual did not yet do. Are we to respect baby Hitler’s rights, or is there some other right that supersedes his and would allow us to terminate him? Now think about this in the context of an unborn child. Suppose that the mother already has seven kids and can barely feed them. The birth of the eighth would almost certainly put such a burden on the family that three of the children starve to death. Is that unborn baby innocent? Is it guilty of anything? Would abortion be justified? There is no obvious answer. In one sense it seems wrong to say that someone can be guilty of something they did not yet commit, but these two cases push the limits of that conception of innocence. Furthermore, in the second case, even if the unborn child was deemed ‘guilty,’ it doesn’t follow that it should be killed. 

That seems to be the most potent objection, as I don’t think assumption two is questionable. However, there are two other responses I’d like to point out. One could always dispute the evidence provided for the second premise, but assume that the second premise is sufficiently strong. This argument still doesn’t outlaw abortion before the fetus could be determined capable of conscious action. In other words, the argument is constrained by how early we can determine a fetus to be capable of conscious action. So, it does nothing for the pro-life advocated who defend abortion earlier than fourteen weeks. Moreover, are any of us capable of conscious action? This is a philosophical question that seems dastardly close to the free-will debate and could destroy the entire argument.   

I wanted to bring up one more thing – the common objection from the pro-choice community in which they accuse pro-lifers of “trying to take away a woman’s right to choose,” and that “men should have no say in making laws that impact women.” I think that these claims are just rhetorical attempts to shut down debate. The reason I think this is that they aren’t supported, and appear to be claiming that some Kabal of men seeks to control women, as opposed to pro-life men and women arguing from axioms. In actuality, the pro-life movement’s position follows from their conceptions about human personhood innocence and murder. I’ve tried to present this as clearly as I can above and hope that people will come to see this and engage with the arguments themselves as opposed to making unsubstantiated claims. I also think that the objection cited above is an inconsistent application of a principle. Does the fetus, given that it will grow up to be a woman, not have a right to her own body? The crux of this question once again reiterates my previous point in regards to what the main issue here is; for if the fetus is a human person, then she/he would have a right to their own body, just as all human persons do.

Pace the pro-choicers who make the objection, I’d like to point out that their claim relies on the assumption that only men are active in the pro-life community, and that only men are the ones who push for laws restricting abortions. My first point in countering those implicit premises is to look at Kelsey Hazzard, Laura Nicholson, Ellen Snyder, or any of the many other secular pro-lifers. These women have based their position on arguments resembling the main one in this essay. Also, women are part of the legislation that pushes for a pro-life position in government.     I hope that after reading this, each of you will leave with a better understanding of both sides of the debate. And I hope that this will allow us to have more civil discourse and come to respect each other’s views. I’ve tried to present the strongest version of an interesting pro-life argument, and the strongest objections to it. On one last note, I think that the pro-choice side, if they want to compete with the arguments of the pro-life advocates, have to come up with a consistent definition of personhood and take the arguments of their ‘opponents’ seriously. If they don’t, then Roe v. Wade could very well be overturned in the coming years.